Strengthening Safety and Security of Biological Research Globally in Support of the Biological Weapons Convention
This project seeks to support and promote global best practices in biorisk management and research oversight, thereby supporting States Parties’ national Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) implementation efforts. By working with policymakers, senior practitioners, laboratory operations and maintenance (O&M) personnel, and stakeholders across the research lifecycle, EBRC will endeavor to build community to support i) O&M for high containment labs, ii) review and oversight of high-risk research, and iii) the growth of empirically-based biosafety practices.
PROJECT OVERVIEW
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) bans the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons and stands as a cornerstone of the global conviction that the use of biological agents and toxins as a weapon of war by anyone at any time is unacceptable. Underlying this norm is States Parties’ national implementation of the convention, ensuring that laws, policies, and practices safeguard the use of biology in their territories. Implementation of the BWC is an urgent priority to ensure biological research is done for peaceful purposes that do not have detrimental impacts. Gaps in biorisk management and research oversight must be addressed to avoid laboratory incidents and to enable the international research community to continue advancing biological knowledge and understanding safely and securely. Biology is not bound by borders, thus biorisk management gaps can only be meaningfully addressed by bringing stakeholders—such as researchers, biosafety professionals, and policy makers— from around the globe together to share perspectives, priorities, best practices, and lessons learned. In doing so, we can work together productively to shape policies and practices across international boundaries to enable safe and secure research across the globe.
To support the development of international guidelines, standards, and practices for biologically safe and secure research, the EBRC will coordinate several activities in collaboration with members of the international research community:
- Support the development and implementation of robust operations and management policies and practices in Latin American high containment laboratories
- Identify, assess, and promote practical review and oversight policies and practices for potentially dangerous gain of function research
- Coordinate research work and knowledge sharing of applied biosafety research to strengthen the basis for evidence-based biosafety and biosecurity.
Global needs for biosafety and biosecurity are constantly changing as new discoveries and techniques are developed in engineering biology. International collaboration and an evolving evidence-based approach are key to ensuring that biological research continues to provide maximum societal benefits while continuing to operate with extremely minimal risks. This project as with other security-focused work at EBRC continues to support the construction and maintenance of a robust, systematic, and internationally interconnected biosafety and biosecurity landscape.
Workshops
High Containment Laboratory Operations and Maintenance Guidebook Workshop
June 16-17, 2026 | Buenos Aires, Argentina
High containment lab facilities are becoming more common in Latin America as domestic capabilities in disease diagnostics, research, and public health surveillance increase. Maintaining biocontainment in these facilities relies on a variety of specialized systems and equipment. Ensuring personnel have the training and resources needed to operate & maintain this equipment is essential to prevent accidental or deliberate release of high risk biological agents from high containment labs.
This two-day workshop will bring together experts from across Latin America working in high containment lab O&M to contribute to a guidebook on O&M best practices and resources; establish a community of practice for collective problem solving and information sharing; and identify areas of need for further support of high containment lab O&M.
ABOUT
This project is funded via a cooperative agreement with the United States Department of State. The opinions, findings and conclusions stated herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Department of State.
